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Regulatory Burdens in Tax Administration and Firms’ Compliance Costs 
in Africa 
 
Merima Ali 
 
Summary 
 
This paper examines the effect of regulatory burdens related to tax administration on firms’ 
compliance costs in Africa. Using cross-country firm-level data, the results show that 
regulatory burdens related to tax administration significantly increase firms’ compliance costs 
compared to burdens related to other kinds of government regulations. The results further 
show that firms’ relationships with tax officials affect their compliance costs. While firms that 
are frequently inspected by tax officials have higher compliance costs, firms that are 
requested to pay bribes by tax officials, on the other hand, have lower compliance costs. 
These results, which remain robust after accounting for other firm-, sector- and country-
specific factors, highlight that regulatory burdens related to taxation play a bigger role in 
increasing overall compliance costs in Africa than other forms of regulatory burdens, and that 
firms may look to informal ways to reduce the burden by paying bribes to tax officials. 
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Introduction 
 
A high fiscal tax burden on businesses and its negative effects on foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows, investment and entrepreneurship has been the topic of considerable research 
(see for example Nam and Radulescu 2007; Djankov, Ganster, McLiesh, Famalho and 
Shleifer 2008; Johannes, Clemens and Nadin 2012; Haufler, Norbäck and Persson 2014). 
However, the costs that businesses incur in actually paying their taxes have not been given 
sufficient attention in public policy debates, especially in developing countries (Bird 2015). 
Tax compliance costs, which sometimes are also considered as hidden costs, are the extra 
costs incurred by taxpayers besides the actual tax liability in the process of becoming and 
remaining tax compliant (Evans 2008). It is noted that developing countries in general have 
inefficient tax administration, often associated with corruption, that contributes to higher 
compliance costs (Bird 2015). Such costs can be in the form of the opportunity cost of staff 
time in collecting and organising receipts, completing tax forms, appealing taxes and 
remitting returns, and the monetary costs of outsourcing such activities to professionals. 
Studies show that tax compliance costs may be larger than the actual taxes paid by 
businesses (Sandford 1995) and that they are regressive, with smaller businesses carrying a 
disproportionately higher burden (Evans 2008; Coolidge and Ilic 2009). Just like other 
regulatory burdens that firms face, tax compliance may impose economic costs by diverting 
productive resources away from producing goods and services towards complying with taxes 
(Loayza and Servén 2010). Such costs can create inefficiencies at the firm level, which may 
alter business activities by affecting their competitiveness, productivity and incentives to 
innovate. Higher levels of compliance costs may also encourage firms to work outside of the 
legal framework and become informal (Thiessen 2003). In general, it is more likely for 
countries with weak institutional set-ups to have an inefficient tax administration system and 
hence higher tax compliance costs, making the issue more relevant for developing countries. 
As noted by Bird (2015), efficient tax administration is important in not only reducing 
compliance costs but also in shaping economic development and building an effective state.   
 
Although several studies on tax compliance have been carried out in developed countries 
(see Evans 2008 and Eichfelder and Vaillancourt 2014 for an overview), similar evidence on 
businesses in developing countries in general and Africa in particular is largely missing due 
to lack of data. A number of surveys carried out by the World Bank gave evidence on tax 
compliance costs from selected developing and transition countries (Coolidge 2012). 
Although the information is the first of its kind to provide firm-level comprehensive and 
detailed data on compliance costs, it covers only four African countries. Dabla-Norris, Misch, 
Cleary and Khwaja (2017) use country-level tax administration quality indices to examine the 
effect of the tax compliance burden on firm performance in developing and transition 
countries. The tax administration quality index captures the different aspects of the tax 
compliance burden borne by firms, starting from the support that businesses get in terms of 
taxpayer information, to the actual tax compliance costs both when filing and post-filing 
taxes, and the extent of accountability and transparency on the part of the tax authorities. 
However, the tax administration quality index is not extracted directly from firms’ responses 
but rather from expert assessment of the respective countries. The expert assessment, 
which provides an aggregate figure of the tax administration quality index at the country 
level, thus does not allow one to assess how the quality varies across firms.  
 
The objective of this paper is to examine the effect of regulatory burdens related to tax 
administration on firms’ compliance costs. The paper uses firm-level indicators of compliance 
costs measured as an opportunity cost of staff time dealing with various government 
regulations including those related to taxation. Data is obtained from the World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys.1 The surveys collect data on firms of different sizes operating in different 
                                                            
1  Enterprise Surveys offer economic data on 131,000 firms in 139 countries. http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
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sectors. One key advantage of this dataset is its use of standardised questionnaires and its 
broad coverage of different variables that are comparable across countries, such as firms’ 
age, sector, location, employment, and their perceptions about the extent to which different 
kinds of government regulations are a burden to businesses performance. As most countries 
are not surveyed each year, the study uses the most recent data available for each country 
between the years 2014 and 2016. The study uses all 17 sub-Saharan African countries 
(SSA) that are available in the dataset between the years 2014 and 2016.2 Various country-
level indicators from different sources complement the Enterprise Surveys.  
 
The results show that regulatory burdens related to tax administration significantly increase 
compliance costs compared to burdens related to other kinds of government regulations, 
such as labour regulations, customs and trade regulations and business licences and 
permits. The paper further examines the effect of firms’ relationships with tax-officials on their 
compliance costs. While firms that are frequently inspected by tax officials have higher 
compliance costs, firms that are requested to pay bribes by tax officials, on the other hand, 
have lower compliance costs. These results, that remain robust after accounting for other 
firm-, sector- and country-specific factors, highlight that, of the different kinds of government 
regulations that firms face, those related to taxation play a bigger role in increasing 
compliance costs in SSA than other forms of regulatory burdens and that firms may look to 
informal ways to reduce the burden by paying bribes to tax officials. 
 
This study expands the literature on tax compliance costs in several dimensions. First, the 
study compares regulatory burdens related to tax administration with other forms of 
government regulations in taking up staff time. Second, unlike a previous study that focuses 
on few African countries, the study provides cross-country evidence on a number of SSA 
countries. Third, the firm-level measure of compliance costs allows us to look at variations 
among firms within the same country and examine the correlation with policy relevant micro- 
and macro-level indicators. It also adds to studies that have looked at the impact of the 
business environment and regulations on both overall economic performance and on firms’ 
performance. For example, Berthold and Arilton (2011) looked at how regulations that put a 
barrier on new firm entry affect long-term growth. Barseghyan (2008) also investigated how 
entry costs affect output and productivity of firms and Dutz, Kessides, O’Connell and Willig 
(2011) linked a better business environment with product and process innovation of young 
firms. Just like other government regulations, those related to tax administration are also 
expected to add a burden to firms and have an economy-wide implication by affecting firms’ 
performance. 
 
The study is organised as follows. Section 1 presents a descriptive analysis of compliance 
costs across SSA and presents its link with regulatory burdens related to tax administration. 
Section 2 presents the econometric specification and the hypothesis to be tested. Section 3 
presents the regression results and Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
1  Compliance costs, institutional quality and 
tax administration burden 
 
The outcome variable in this study is a firm-level indicator of compliance costs, which is 
measured as the percentage of management time spent in dealing with various government 
regulations in one week, such as taxes, customs, labour regulations, licensing and 
registration. Data is obtained from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. The study uses the 
                                                            
2  These countries are Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. 
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most recent data available for each country between the years 2014 and 2016. Descriptive 
statistics of the compliance cost measure and other variables from the Enterprise Surveys 
that are used throughout the study are provided in Table 11 in the appendix. Figure 1 shows 
the average compliance costs across countries. On average, managers in a typical firm in a 
formal sector in SSA spend about 10 per cent of their time dealing with government 
regulations every week. If a typical manager of a firm works for eight hours a day and five 
days a week, regulation alone will take up to four hours of their time in one week or 208 
hours in one year. 3 This is equivalent to 1.3 months spent every year in a typical firm in SSA 
just dealing with government regulations. This figure is expected to be much higher as most 
enterprises, especially family-owned businesses, are likely to work overtime. Looking at the 
data for specific countries indicates that firms in South Sudan have the highest compliance 
costs, with a typical manager spending on average around 18 per cent of their time per week 
dealing with various government regulations. Madagascar, Ethiopia and Mauritania also have 
their managers spending on average 12-13 per cent of their time dealing with government 
regulations in one week. Countries like DRC, Djibouti, Sudan, Burundi and Tanzania, on the 
other hand, have low levels of compliance costs, with a manager in a typical firm spending 
on average less than 5 per cent of their time dealing with government regulations. 
 
 
Figure 1 Average management time spent in dealing with government regulations (in 
per cent)4 
 
The study next looks at the correlation between compliance costs and the quality of 
institutions. There are good reasons to expect that countries where firms face high 
compliance costs are also countries with weak institutional qualities. This is because, in 
general, countries with better institutions tend to create an environment that is more 
conducive for businesses to flourish and are more likely to enforce rules and regulations in a 
more transparent and predictable way. Figure 2 depicts the correlation between country-level 
compliance costs (which are constructed by averaging compliance costs for firms in each 
                                                            
3  40 hours of work per week x 10 per cent = four hours per week. 
   Four hours per week x 52 weeks = 208 hours in one year. 
4  Sampling weights are used to calculate the percentages. 
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country) and index for regulatory quality that captures the ‘perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development’.5 Data on regulatory quality is obtained from the World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators6 for the year 2013 (one year before the start of the 
individual level data from the Enterprise Surveys). The figure depicts a strong correlation 
whereby countries with better regulatory quality are associated with lower compliance costs. 
However, the negative correlation might be driven by outlier countries that have either the 
highest compliance costs or the weakest institutional quality, or both. The correlation graph is 
constructed again without outlier countries like South Sudan and Sudan. This figure, which is 
presented in the appendix, shows that the negative correlation still exists with a slightly lower 
correlation index of -0.30.  
 
Figure 2 Cross-country correlation between compliance costs and regulatory quality 
  
The study next looks at the correlation between compliance costs and different regulatory 
burdens that firms face. Respondents in each firm were asked to rank the extent to which 
different regulations are becoming an obstacle to the current operation of a particular firm 
with the following choices: it does not apply to them, no obstacle, minor obstacle, moderate 
obstacle, major obstacle and very severe obstacle. Respondents in each firm were asked to 
respond regarding four types of regulations: tax administration, labour regulations, customs 
and trade regulations, and regulations related to business licensing and permits. Those firms 
which responded that the specific regulation does not apply or that it is not an obstacle are 
given a value of 0. Then a value of 1-4 is given for those firms which responded that it is a 
minor, moderate, major or very severe obstacle, respectively. The higher the value, the more 
a particular government regulation is a burden on the performance of the firm. Descriptive 
statistics of the ranked responses are provided in Table 11 in the appendix. 
 
Table 1 below shows the pairwise correlation between compliance costs and the different 
kinds of regulatory burdens that firms face. The results show that, compared to other 
                                                            
5  Quote from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/rq.pdf The index is constructed based on surveys of the 
perceptions of enterprises, citizens, and experts. 
6  http://info.worldbank.org/governance/WGI/#home 
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regulatory burdens, the one that is related to tax administration is significantly and strongly 
correlated with compliance costs.   
 
Table 1 Pairwise correlation between management time spent in dealing with 
government regulations and perceptions about the burden of different government 
regulations 
 Log % of 
management time 
in dealing with 
govt. regulations 
Tax 
administration 
burden (rank) 
Business 
licensing/ 
permits (rank) 
Customs/ 
trade 
regulations 
(rank)  
Labour 
regulations 
(rank) 
Log % of management time in 
dealing with govt. regulations 
 
 
1.0000 
    
Tax administration  
burden (rank) 
 
0.1196***   
(0.0000)    
1.0000    
Business 
licensing/ permits (rank) 
 
0.0493***    
(0.0000)    
0.4714***   
(0.0000)     
1.0000   
Customs/trade 
regulations (rank) 
 
0.0549*** 
(0.0000)      
0.3143*** 
(0.0000)    
0.3610*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
Labour regulations 
(rank) 
-0.0407*** 
(1.0000)       
0.2621***    
(0.0000)    
0.3598*** 
(0.0000)    
0.3006*** 
(0.7383)   
1.0000 
*** p < 0.01, P-values in parentheses, sampling weight is used. 
 
Figure 3 shows the percentage of firms in each country which responded that tax 
administration is a major obstacle and a very severe obstacle for the performance of their 
business. As can be seen in the figure, more than 80 per cent of firms in Ethiopia consider 
tax administration as a major or very severe obstacle. According to the World Development 
Report, Ethiopia is next to Brazil in terms of having a large proportion of firms considering tax 
administration as a serious burden (WDR 2004). Figure 3 further shows that close to 40 per 
cent of firms in Namibia consider tax administration as a serious obstacle. This is followed by 
Uganda, Tanzania and Nigeria where close to 20 per cent of firms responded accordingly.  
 
The study further checks the cross-country correlation between the average compliance 
costs of government regulations and the tax compliance cost measure. Data on the latter is 
obtained from the World Bank’s Doing Business database7 that measured the time (in hours) 
that a typical firm spent in preparing and paying taxes for 2013 (one year before the start of 
the individual level data from the Enterprise Surveys).8 Figure 4 shows a positive correlation 
in which countries that spend more time in preparing and paying taxes tend to have firms that 
on average spend more staff time in dealing with various government regulations, including 
those related to taxation. This confirms, once again, that compliance costs related to taxation 
are likely to be the most important regulatory burden that firms face in SSA in terms of 
increasing the opportunity cost of staff time. These correlations are further confirmed in 
Section 3 of this study using econometric estimations that control for various firm-, sector-, 
location- and country-level variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
7  The ‘Doing Business’ project provides objective measures of business regulations for local firms in 190 economies and 
selected cities at the subnational level. http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
8  Data for South Sudan was obtained for 2014. 
12 
 
Figure 3 Percentage of firms that responded that tax administration is a major and 
very severe obstacle to their business9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Cross-country correlation between government regulation compliance costs 
and tax compliance costs 
 
 
  
                                                            
9  Sampling weights are used to calculate the percentages. 
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2  Variables and hypothesis 
 
The following equation is estimated as a benchmark to analyse the determinants of 
compliance costs.  
 
 
Where, 𝑖, 𝑗 and 𝑘 refer to the firm, industry and country respectively. 𝐶𝐶 captures the firm-
level compliance cost measure as a logarithm of the percentage of management time spent 
in dealing with various government regulations. 𝑍 is a vector of standard firm-specific factors 
and 𝑅 is a vector of respondents’ perception at firm level about the burden of various 
government regulations. 𝑆, 𝐿  and 𝑌 indicate industry, location and country fixed effects.  
 
Descriptive statistics of variables included in the different economic estimations throughout 
this study are provided in Table 11 in the appendix. 
 
2.1 Firm-specific factors 
 
Firm-specific factors included in the above specification are the age and size of the firm; the 
experience of the manager; whether the owner is female or not; the firm’s ownership status; 
and whether it exports its products or not.  
 
A firm’s age and size are used to proxy for its competence in complying with various 
government regulations. Older firms are expected to have acquired the necessary 
experience and knowhow to achieve lower compliance costs. Similarly, larger firms tend to 
have economies of scale advantages to absorb compliance costs because of their high 
turnover and their ability to hire specialised staffs to deal with such regulations (SBP 2008). A 
firm’s age is captured by years since the business was established. The average age of firms 
in the sample is 13 years. The size variable is generated from the total number of full time 
employees, adjusted for temporary workers. Dummy variables for different categories of firm 
size are used. Following the definition used by the Enterprise Surveys, a dummy variable for 
small sized firms is generated if employment is less than 20. Dummy variables for medium 
and large firms are generated if employment is between 20 and 100 and greater than 100, 
respectively. The majority of the firms in the sample are small firms (69 per cent) that employ 
fewer than 20 people. 
 
In addition to a firm’s age and size, compliance costs may also depend on the competence of 
the staff who are dealing with various government regulations. For this, we use the 
experience of the top manager of the firm in terms of years that he/she has been working in 
the sector. Top managers of firms in the sample have an average of 14 years of experience 
working in a specific sector. 
 
A number of studies suggest that female-owned businesses are smaller due to various 
formal and informal institutional constraints they face compared to male-owned businesses 
(Coleman 2007). Studies also suggest that female-owned businesses are burdened more 
with regulations related to the labour market and tax legislation compared to male-owned 
businesses (Aidis, Welter, Smallbone and Isakova 2007). Given that a large proportion of 
small firms in SSA are likely to be owned by women (Amin 2010), one might expect that such 
businesses may be more burdened with compliance costs compared to male-owned ones. 
Female ownership is captured by a dummy variable that has a value of 1 if more than 75 per 
cent of the enterprise is owned by women and 0 otherwise. In the sample, 29 per cent of 
firms are owned by women. 
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Even though all firms in the formal sector of a certain country are expected to be subject to 
the same set of regulations and administrative procedures, the burden is likely to differ based 
on the ownership structure of firms. Some argue that state-owned enterprises are likely to 
face lower burdens from government regulations since they tend to have more information 
about regulatory procedures (Shapiro and Willig 1990). State ownership is also likely to 
reduce the transactions costs of regulations as contracting becomes easier when the ‘state 
both owns and regulates’ (Jalilian, Kirkpatrick and Parket 2007). On the other hand, others 
argue that combined production and regulatory roles can create inherent conflicts of interest 
that may reduce public-owned enterprises from complying with various government 
regulations (Djankov and Murrell 2002). Public enterprises may also face a higher burden in 
meeting various government regulations because they lack the necessary resources due to 
limited budget support from the government or because their ‘prices are regulated with 
political criteria’ (WDR 2004: 97). Public ownership is captured by a dummy variable with a 
value of 1 if the firm is publicly owned and 0 otherwise. Only 4 per cent of firms in the sample 
are publicly owned. 
 
Government regulations in general are known to negatively affect firms’ competitiveness and 
innovation performance (Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt and Prandtl 2006). One area where 
firms can exercise their innovative performance is in the export sector. Studies show that 
firms that export have a higher propensity to become innovative and are more competitive 
compared to firms that do not export (Roper and Love 2002). Previous studies also found 
that government regulations negatively affect firms’ export performance (see for example 
Freund and Rocha 2011; and Portugal-Perez and Wilson 2012). The effect could also go the 
other way. Given the volume of their transactions and scale of operation, export-oriented 
firms might face a disproportionate burden to meet the various government regulations 
compared to domestic-oriented firms. A dummy variable that has a value of 1 if the firm 
exports its products and 0 otherwise is generated in order to see the difference in compliance 
costs between firms depending on their market orientation. Eleven per cent of firms in the 
sample export their products. 
 
2.2 Sector-specific factors 
 
To capture the heterogeneity in compliance costs across sectors, the study uses dummies 
for detailed industrial classification, as presented in Table 1 in the appendix. 
 
2.3 Location-specific factors 
 
Although businesses in the same country are expected to face the same regulatory laws 
regardless of where they are operating, the burden is likely to differ by location. However, 
how location can determine compliance costs may depend on a number of factors. On the 
one hand, businesses operating in areas where there is better infrastructure in terms of 
access to roads, electricity and the internet are likely to face less of a compliance burden 
compared to those that do not have such access. Furthermore, bigger cities tend to have an 
agglomeration of businesses that help facilitate flow of information among firms and reduce 
compliance costs that may arise from information asymmetry. On the other hand, due to their 
proximity, government officials may inspect firms operating in bigger cities more often 
compared to those in remote areas, which may increase the compliance costs in terms of 
opportunity cost of staff time. In order to capture heterogeneity in compliance costs across 
locations, the study uses dummy variables based on the population size of the cities that 
business are operating in. Five dummies are generated based on the following categories: 
whether the location is a capital city or not; and whether the location has a population greater 
than 1 million, between 250,000 and one million, between 50,000 and 250,000, or less than 
50,000.  
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In addition to location fixed effects, country fixed effects are included in the above 
econometric specification to control for country-level time invariant factors that can be 
correlated with compliance costs, such as those related to policy, institutions, regulatory 
quality and aggregate economic growth. In Section 3.3, alternative econometric specification 
is used to look at specific policy-relevant country-level indicators that determine compliance 
costs.   
 
 
3  Empirical results 
 
3.1 Benchmark result 
 
Table 2 reports the benchmark results using firm-specific factors and sector, location and 
country fixed effects estimated using the ordinary least squares method. The results show 
that medium-sized firms are disproportionately burdened with higher compliance costs.10 The 
result in column IV shows that medium-sized firms spend on average 26 per cent more of 
their staff time in one week to deal with government regulations than large firms. This 
indicates that the relationship between compliance costs and firms’ size is not linear and that 
it first increases and then decreases with size. Since small firms have limited transactions 
and smaller operations, they might not have to deal with government regulations as much as 
medium-sized and large firms. Smaller firms can also reduce their compliance costs through 
either informality or evasion (WDR 2004). Similarly, large firms may use their economies of 
scale to absorb the extra burdens of complying with government regulations. Furthermore, 
larger firms are likely to be politically connected, which can make them ‘immune’ to different 
regulatory burdens and hence face lower compliance costs (Fisman 2001).   
 
As expected, firms operating in the export sector are correlated with high compliance costs. 
Those in the export sector spend about 23 per cent more management time dealing with 
government regulations compared to those that do not export. Results on management 
experience and public dummy have the expected signs but are not statistically significant.  
 
Figure 5 shows statistically significant regression coefficients on the different sector 
dummies. The coefficients are obtained from the econometric specification in column IV of 
table 2. The figure depicts that in general, the manufacturing sector faces a higher 
compliance cost on government regulations compared to other sectors. Manufacturing 
sectors such as auto and auto components, wood furniture, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, 
food processing, garment sector, and other manufacturing sectors face a higher burden. On 
the other hand, the electronics, metal and machinery and the leather sector in general face a 
lower compliance cost. Among the service sectors, the one that faces the highest compliance 
cost is the construction and transportation sector. Sectors like hotels and restaurants and 
other services are not significantly affected by compliance costs, hence are not included in 
the figure. Retail and wholesale trade also have a statistically significant compliance cost, but 
not as much as most of the manufacturing sectors and the construction and transportation 
sector. Evidence on compliance cost differences by sector will have relevant policy 
implications for whether high compliance costs can cause misallocation of resources by 
diverting investment from sectors with high compliance costs to sectors with low compliance 
costs. 
 
 
 
                                                            
10  A different classification for firm size, where small firms are defined as those employing less than 10 people and 
medium-sized firms as those employing between 10-100, was also used, which gave similar results. 
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Table 2 Benchmark result with firm-specific factors and sector, location and country 
fixed effects 
Dependent variable: Log percentage of management time spent in dealing with government regulations 
      I  II  III  IV  
Log age       -0.01  0.04  0.04  0.00 
(0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06) 
Small (dummy)     0.13  0.14  0.14  0.21 
(0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14) 
Medium (dummy)     0.32**  0.33**  0.31**  0.26* 
(0.13)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.13) 
Female (dummy)     -0.03  -0.06  -0.07  -0.08 
(0.14)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.08) 
Log management experience    -0.13  -0.14  -0.14  -0.11 
(0.12)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.09) 
Public (dummy)     -0.01  -0.01  -0.03  0.14 
(0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
Export (dummy)     0.13**  0.15  0.20*  0.23* 
(0.05)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.12) 
Sector fixed effect       Yes  Yes  Yes 
City population fixed effect        Yes  Yes  
Country fixed effect           Yes  
Constant      1.56***  1.13***  0.61***               1.12*** 
(0.34)  (0.32)  (0.19)  (0.15) 
R2      0.008  0.025  0.036  0.115 
Number of firms      8538  8538  8538  8538 
Robust standard errors, clustered at industrial sectors, are in parentheses. Sampling weight is used in the regression.  
∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%. 
 
 
Figure 5 Statistically significant regression coefficients of different sectors 
 
 
 
3.2 Compliance costs and tax administration burden 
 
This section reports results on the correlations between overall compliance costs and various 
government regulations. As mentioned in Section 1 above, respondents’ perceptions at firm 
level of four different types of government regulations are used in the regression. The ranked 
responses indicate to what extent tax administration, business licensing and permits, 
customs and trade regulations and labour regulations are considered as a burden to the 
current operation of business. The higher the rank, the more serious the particular regulation 
is considered to be an obstacle for businesses. Some firms responded ‘I don’t know’ when 
asked to rank the burden of the various regulations. This results in a slight decline in the 
sample size as indicated in Table 3.  
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Table 3 Compliance cost and businesses’ perception about different regulatory 
burdens 
Dependent variable: Log percentage of management time spent in dealing with government regulations 
      I  II  III  IV 
Log age      0.00  -0.01  0.01  -0.01 
(0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
Small (dummy)      0.20  0.19  0.19  0.19 
(0.14)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15) 
Medium (dummy)     0.25  0.25  0.25  0.24  
(0.15)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.16) 
Log management experience    -0.11  -0.09  -0.09  -0.09 
(0.10)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09) 
Female (dummy)     -0.11  -0.13*  -0.13*  -0.12* 
(0.08)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Public (dummy)     0.17*  0.20*  0.20*  0.20* 
(0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
Export (dummy)     0.26**  0.26**  0.26**                 0.23** 
(0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.12) 
Tax administration (rank)    0.17***  0.18***  0.17***               0.14*** 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Labour regulation (rank)      -0.05  -0.05  -0.07 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
License permit (rank)        0.04**                 0.04** 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
Customs and trade (rank)          0.06 
            (0.05) 
Constant      0.71***  0.71***  0.68***               0.68*** 
(0.16)  (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.23) 
R2       0.135  0.139  0.140  0.142 
Number of firms     8462  8407  8373  8194 
Sector fixed effect, city population fixed effect and country fixed effect are included in all of the specifications. 
Robust standard errors, clustered at industrial sectors, are in parentheses. Sampling weight is used in the regression.  
∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%. 
 
Table 3 shows regression results between the various indicators of regulatory burdens and 
the compliance cost measure after accounting for firm-specific factors and sector, location 
and country fixed effects. The regression results in column IV indicate that an increase in 
firms’ perception about the tax administration burden by one unit increases the percentage of 
management time spent in dealing with government regulations by 14 per cent. The 
regulatory burden relating to license and business permits also contributes to overall 
compliance costs, but only marginally (by about 4 per cent). Regulatory burdens related to 
labour regulations and customs and trade do not have a statistically significant relationship 
with overall compliance costs. This indicates that of the different types of government 
regulations that firms face, the one associated with tax administration seems to result in a 
higher compliance cost in terms of the opportunity cost of staff time.    
 
The regression results reported in Table 3 also show that after controlling for responses on 
the perception of various regulatory burdens, the coefficient on size becomes insignificant, 
while the coefficient on the export sector remains significant. In addition, the coefficients on 
female ownership and public ownership become statistically significant. Unlike the expected 
results, female-owned businesses face lower compliance costs than male-owned 
businesses. A possible explanation for the negative relationship between female ownership 
and compliance costs could be that most female-owned businesses are much smaller 
compared to male-owned businesses. In the sample, almost 38 per cent of the female-
owned businesses employed fewer than 10 people and close to 58 per cent employed fewer 
than 20 people. Following the non-linear relationship between size and compliance costs 
indicated in Table 2, female-owned businesses may then face lower compliance costs either 
because of their limited transactions or due to informality or evasion. The positive coefficient 
of the public ownership dummy highlights that publicly-owned firms in SSA may lack the 
necessary resources to lower their compliance costs. 
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3.3 Compliance costs, institutional quality and legal origin  
 
This section reports results on the correlation between various country-level economic and 
institutional quality indicators and firm-level compliance costs. Most of the country-level 
variables, as indicated in Table 4, are obtained for the year 2013, one year before the data 
on firm-level indicators from the Enterprise Surveys begins. The first country-level variable 
used is GDP per capita. Studies show that in general, countries with low income are often 
associated with poor public service provision and burdensome regulatory framework 
(Caballero and Hammour 1996). The second variable is non-resource tax as a share of GDP, 
which is an indicator of the overall fiscal capacity of each country in general and the tax 
administration infrastructure in particular. Countries with lower tax to GDP ratio are expected 
to have higher regulatory burdens on firms, because of lack of resources and the bare 
minimum tax administration infrastructure and underdeveloped market institutions in those 
countries (Bird 2015).  
 
Table 4 Data source and year for country-level indicators 
Variable Source Year 
GDP per capita (current/PPP) World Bank Development Indicator 2013 
Non-resource tax to GDP ratio ICTD Government Revenue Dataset 2013 
Regulatory quality Worldwide Governance Indicators 2013 
Corruption Worldwide Governance Indicators 2013 
Time to pay tax (hours)∗ Doing Business Database (World Bank) 2013 
Number of tax payments per year∗ Doing Business Database (World Bank) 2013 
Post-tax filing index Doing Business Database (World Bank) 2017 
∗ Data for South Sudan was obtained for 2014 
 
In addition to income and fiscal capacity, overall institutional quality may also determine 
firms’ compliance cost. In general, countries with better institutions tend to create an 
environment that is more conducive for business, and are more likely to enforce rules and 
regulations in a more transparent and predictable way. Firms operating in countries with 
better institutional qualities are hence expected to face lower compliance costs. The study 
used two indicators of institutional quality: regulatory quality and corruption. Both indicators 
are based on surveys of the perceptions of enterprises, citizens, and experts.11 The 
regulatory quality index captures the ‘ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development’.12 The 
higher the value of the index, the better is the regulatory quality of a particular country. The 
other indicator of institutional quality used in the study is control over corruption. Djankov, La 
Porta, Lepez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) argue that some countries may deliberately 
make regulatory procedures complex in order to benefit the regulators themselves, through 
bribes and informal payments to break or ‘bend the rules’. If this is the case, firms operating 
in countries with better control on corruption are expected to face lower compliance costs. 
The index captures ‘perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by 
elites and private interests’.13 The higher the index, the better that the country is able to 
control corruption. 
 
Historical factors are likely to shape the current regulatory environment of different countries. 
Legal traditions introduced into various countries through colonisation and various 
occupations tend to have a strong correlation with regulations (see La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer 2008 for an overview). Specifically, studies show that regulatory 
burdens such as those related to starting a business and the labour markets are correlated 
with legal origins (Djankov et al., 2002). In general, civil law is associated with burdensome 
regulations and common law is associated with greater judicial independence (Djankov, La 
                                                            
11  These indicators are constructed from various data sources gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, 
non-governmental organisations, international organisations, and private sector firms. For a more detailed discussion of 
how the indicators are constructed, please see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home. 
12 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/rq.pdf 
13  https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/cc.pdf 
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Porta, Lepez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2003 and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleches 
and Shleifer 2004). Following this, it is expected that firms that operate in countries that are 
likely to have common law legal origin will have lower compliance costs compared to those 
operating in countries with civil law legal origins. In the sample, 10 countries were former 
British colonies, four countries were former French colonies and two countries were former 
Belgian colonies. A dummy variable is generated to capture whether the country is a former 
British colony or not as a proxy for common law legal origin. 
 
Table 5 Pairwise correlation between country-level variables 
 Log GDP per 
capita 
Tax to GDP  
ratio 
Regulatory  
quality 
Corruption  Former 
British  
colony (dummy) 
Log GDP  
per capita  
 
1.0000 
 
    
Tax to GDP  
ratio  
0.2966***   
(0.0000) 
    
1.0000    
Regulatory  
quality  
0.2897***    
(0.0000) 
    
0.6582***   
(0.0000)  
1.0000   
Corruption  0.0193 
(0.3823) 
    
0.8199*  ***   
(0.0000) 
0.5271***     
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
Former British  
colony (dummy) 
0.6104*   
(0.0000)       
0.0294 (0.0157) 0.3552***   
(0.0000) 
-0.3765*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000 
*** p < 0.01, P-values in parentheses. 
 
Table 5 reports the pairwise correlation between the different economic and institutional 
country-level indicators used in the regression. Higher GDP per capita is correlated 
significantly with high tax to GDP ratio and better regulatory quality. Former British colonies 
have positive correlation with GDP per capita and tax to GDP ratio and better regulatory 
quality, and negative correlation with control over corruption. Regulatory quality is also 
strongly correlated with better control over corruption.  
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Table 6 Compliance costs, institutional quality and legal origin 
Dependent variable: Log percentage of management time spent in dealing with government regulations  
      I  II   III  IV  
Log age      0.04  0.03  0.03  -0.01 
(0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  
Small (dummy)     0.17  0.13  0.19  0.20  
(0.14)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.14) 
Medium (dummy)     0.27  0.23  0.25  0.25 
(0.16)  (0.17)  (0.15)  (0.15) 
Log management experience    -0.16  -0.15  -0.13  -0.09 
(0.12)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.09) 
Female (dummy)     -0.08  -0.05  -0.05  -0.08 
(0.10)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
Public (dummy)     -0.07  0.00  0.06  0.12 
      (0.15)  (0.16)  (0.12)  (0.12) 
Export (dummy)     0.28**  0.28**  0.30**                 0.28** 
(0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11) 
Tax administration (rank)    0.14***  0.13***  0.11***               0.12*** 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Labour regulation (rank)    -0.10***  -0.11***  -0.08*  -0.08* 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
License permit (rank)    0.02  0.01  0.03*  0.04* 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Customs and trade rank)    0.05  0.03  0.04  0.04 
(0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Log GDP per capita (current/PPP)   -0.27***  -0.05  -0.01  -0.01 
(0.07)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.08) 
Tax to GDP       -0.04***  -0.02  -0.00 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Regulatory quality         -0.64***              -0.50*** 
(0.14)  (0.11) 
Corruption         0.25  -0.18 
(0.22)  (0.12) 
Former British colony (dummy)          -0.35 
(0.31) 
Constant      2.84***  2.06***  1.22**               0.95*** 
(0.78)  (0.63)  (0.58)   (0.32) 
R2      0.075  0.092  0.108  0.115 
Number of firms     8194  8194  8194  8194 
Sector fixed effects, city population fixed effects and region fixed effects are included in all the specifications. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at industrial sectors, are in parentheses. Sampling weight is used in the regression. ∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ 
significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%. 
 
Table 6 reports the regression results. Column 1 reports the regression results after including 
GDP per capita. As expected, countries with higher income are correlated with lower 
compliance costs. Column II reports the results after including the non-resource tax as a 
share of GDP that has the expected negative sign. The coefficient on income becomes 
insignificant once the tax to GDP ratio is included in column II. Column III reports results after 
including the two institutional quality indicators. The correlation with regulatory quality is very 
strong. Increasing regulatory quality by one unit is associated with lower compliance costs by 
about 64 per cent.14 The coefficients on income and tax to GDP ratio become insignificant 
when institutional quality indicators are included in the regression. The result on corruption 
has the wrong sign in column III, but once the indicator for legal origins is controlled for in 
column IV, the results confirm the expected sign, but remain insignificant. Column IV reports 
results after including the legal origin indicator. Although the result on legal origin as captured 
by the former British colony dummy has the expected sign, it is not significant. The other 
individual level variables remain significant. The results on the various regulatory burdens 
confirm that tax administration remains the most important determinant of compliance costs 
even after controlling for various country-level indicators.  
 
 
                                                            
14  Using rule of law as an alternative indicator of institutional quality gave the same result. The rule of law index has a very 
high correlation of 0.86 with the regulatory quality index. Hence using it in the same regression with regulatory quality 
will result in multi-collinearity. Rule of law captures perceptions of ‘the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.’ http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdF/rl.pdF  
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3.4 Robustness check using country-level tax compliance cost indicators 
 
Given the strong correlation that the tax administration burden has on overall compliance 
costs, this section further reports results as a robustness check by including three country-
level tax compliance indicators, all obtained from the World Bank Doing Business database 
(see Table 4). 15 The first variable captures the time in hours to prepare and pay taxes. The 
second variable indicates the number of required tax payments per year. Starting from 2017, 
the World Bank Doing Business data also includes a new sub-indicator called the ‘post-filing 
index’ that captures the compliance costs after businesses file their taxes. The post-filing 
index has four components: time in hours to comply with a VAT refund; time in weeks to 
obtain a VAT refund; time in hours to comply with the correction of corporate income tax 
errors; and time in weeks to complete a corporate income tax audit. The index ranges from 
0-100, with 0 indicating the least efficient process and 100 indicating the most efficient 
process. Although the data for the post-filling index is for 2017, one can reasonably assume 
that major changes are less likely to happen in three to four years that can significantly alter 
a country’s regulatory environment.  
 
Table 7 Pairwise correlation between country-level tax compliance indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** p < 0.01, P-values in parentheses. 
 
Table 7 shows the pairwise correlation between the three indicators. There is a strong 
positive correlation between the time taken to prepare and pay taxes and the number of 
payments made in one year. There is also a strong correlation between time, number of 
payments and the post-filing index. Countries that take long hours to prepare and pay taxes 
and those that require frequent payments also have inefficient post-tax filing processes. 
 
 
  
                                                            
15  Information in the Doing Business database is collected based on expert responses (both private sector practitioners 
and government officials) about domestic small and medium-sized manufacturing and retailer firms in 190 economies 
around the world. 
 Log time 
to pay taxes 
Number of tax 
payments 
Post-filing  
index 
Log time to pay taxes 1.0000   
 
Number of 
tax payments 
0.4271***   
(0.0000) 
 
1.0000  
Post-filing 
index 
-0.6437*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.4321***  
 (0.0000) 
1.0000 
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Table 8 Robustness check using country-level tax compliance cost indicators 
Dependent variable: Log percentage of management time spent in dealing with government regulations  
       I  II  III 
Log age       0.02  0.01  -0.00 
    (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Small (dummy)      0.20  0.19  0.19 
       (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.15) 
Medium (dummy)      0.26*  0.25  0.25 
       (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15) 
Log management experience     -0.10  -0.09  -0.09 
       (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.09) 
Female (dummy)      -0.06  -0.08  -0.09 
       (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Public (dummy)      0.14  0.15  0.17 
       (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12) 
Export (dummy)      0.27**  0.27**  0.26** 
       (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11) 
Tax administration (rank)     0.13***  0.13***  0.13*** 
       (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Labour regulation (rank)     -0.07*  -0.06  -0.06 
       (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
License permit (rank)     0.03*  0.04**  0.04**  
       (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Customs and trade (rank)     0.05  0.05  0.05 
       (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Log GDP per capita (current/PPP)    -0.24***  -0.09  -0.18* 
       (0.05)  (0.11)  (0.09) 
Tax to GDP ratio      -0.04**  -0.03**  -0.05** 
       (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Regulatory quality      -0.57***  -0.41***  -0.49*** 
       (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.11) 
Corruption      0.45**  0.27*  0.64** 
       (0.17)  (0.14)  (0.24) 
Former British colony (dummy)    0.21  -0.03  0.14 
       (0.21)  (0.30)  (0.27) 
Log time to pay tax      0.52***  0.43***   0.54*** 
(0.13)  (0.08)  (0.12) 
Number of tax payments       -0.02**  -0.02** 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
Post-tax filing          -0.01** 
(0.00) 
Constant       0.48  0.61*  1.49*** 
      0.38  (0.33)  (0.37) 
R2       0.119  0.125  0.126 
Number of firms      8194  8194  8194 
Sector fixed effects, city population fixed effects and region fixed effects are included in all the regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered at 
industrial sectors, are in parentheses. Sampling weight is used in the regression. ∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%. 
 
Table 8 shows regression results that control for sector, city population and region fixed 
effects. Column I reports the results on time it takes to prepare and pay taxes. The results 
show that there is a strong and significant correlation between the time taken to pay taxes 
and compliance costs relating to government regulations. Firms that operate in countries that 
require more time to prepare and pay taxes are associated with higher compliance costs. 
Column II reports the results after controlling for number of tax payments per year. Although 
it is to be expected that frequent tax payment increases overall compliance costs on firms in 
terms of the opportunity cost of staff time, the results indicate that in fact it is the other way 
round. Firms that operate in countries that generally require more frequent tax payments per 
year are associated with lower compliance costs on government regulations. One possible 
explanation for such a result is that more frequent tax payments may force firms to come up 
with efficient ways of handling their tax filing and overall tax regulations, which in general can 
help lower the opportunity cost of their staff time. Column III reports the results after including 
the post-tax filling index. The result is negative and significant, which indicates that countries 
with more efficient post-tax filing procedures are associated with lower compliance costs. 
Results in Table 8 further reveal that the tax administration burden remains the main 
determinant of compliance costs compared to other regulatory burdens.  
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3.5 Compliance costs, inspection by tax officials and bribe payments  
 
Given that the regulatory burden from tax administration is the main contributor to overall 
compliance costs, in this section, the study further looks at how firms’ relationships with tax 
officials affect their compliance costs. One way that firms may have direct contact with tax 
officials is through a firm inspection or audit. Frequent tax inspections in developing countries 
are noted to increase tax compliance costs by disrupting a firms’ work schedule and 
increasing the opportunity cost of their time (Coolidge 2012). The Enterprise Surveys ask 
firms whether the business has been visited or inspected by tax officials in the past year. 
Conditional on them being visited or inspected by tax officials, firms were then asked the 
number of times that their business was inspected or visited by tax officials in the past year. 
Close to 68 per cent of firms responded that they were visited or inspected by tax officials. 
Firms in SSA have an average inspection rate of between two to four times per year, with 
DRC having by far the highest incidence of inspection by tax officials with a typical firm 
having up to 10 visits by tax officials in one year. This is followed by Ethiopia with close to 
five inspections per year. Figure 6 shows the country-level correlation between average 
number of visits by tax officials and average compliance costs. Since DRC is an outlier, the 
correlation graph is constructed without DRC. The figure confirms that countries where tax 
officials visit firms more frequently are also associated with high compliance costs.  
 
Frequent tax inspection and cumbersome tax filing procedures may further induce firms to 
pay bribes to tax officials. The effect of bribe payments by firms is sometimes considered as 
an additional tax to businesses, except that the payment does not end up in public revenue 
to provide public goods (Fisman and Svensson 2007). Some studies have even argued that 
corruption may be far more burdensome and detrimental to the growth of firms than taxes 
because of the high transaction cost and uncertainty involved in bribe payments (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1993). On the other hand, bribes to tax officials may be considered by firms as an 
efficient business mechanism to help facilitate the time otherwise taken on tax-filing 
procedures, especially in countries with weak institutional frameworks or unclear tax policies 
(Méon and Weill 2010). 
 
Figure 6 Cross-country correlation between compliance costs and frequency of 
inspection by tax officials  
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Before looking at how bribe payment affects overall compliance costs, the study first looks at 
the determinants of bribe payments in order to shed light on what kind of firms, which type of 
regulatory burdens and what kind of country-level conditions are likely to induce bribe 
payment. The study used an indicator for bribe payment based on firms’ responses regarding 
whether tax officials requested a gift or an informal payment during any of the visits they 
made to businesses over the last year.16 A dummy variable for bribe payment is then 
generated that has a value of 1 if firms responded that tax officials requested bribes during 
their visit and 0 otherwise. Because of the sensitivity of the question, a large proportion of 
firms in the sample refused to answer this question. This reduced the sample size to 6,202 
firms, as indicated in Table 9. Close to 70 per cent of firms also stated that tax officials 
requested no payments or gifts. Given the large rate of non-responses and potentially 
inaccurate responses, the results on bribes in the subsequent tables are therefore likely to 
indicate the lower bound correlations. Moreover, as is usually the case in corruption 
literature, the question on bribe payment is formulated in the survey indirectly, asking firms if 
tax officials requested bribes rather than asking them directly if they have actually paid 
bribes. Because of this, one cannot tell for sure if bribes were actually paid to tax officials 
based on the firms’ responses. One should therefore keep this in mind when interpreting the 
results.    
 
  
                                                            
16  Note that this question is asked for those firms that responded that tax officials visited them in the past 12 months. 
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Table 9 Bribe payment, frequency of inspection and tax administration  
Estimation results using linear probability model. Dependent variable: dummy = 1 if bribe was requested by tax officials and 0 
otherwise. 
   I  II  III  IV  V 
 
Log age   0.05**  0.04***  0.03  0.04**  0.03* 
   (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Small (dummy)  0.09  0.05  0.04  0.05  0.04 
   (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Medium (dummy)  -0.01  -0.02  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02 
   (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Log management experience -0.08**  -0.07***   0.04***  -0.06***  -0.05*** 
   (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Female (dummy)  0.02  0.06  0.06**  0.08**  0.07*** 
   (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Public (dummy)  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.01  0.01 
   (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Export (dummy)  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.02 
   (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Frequency of inspection   0.01***  0.01***  0.01***  0.01*** 
     (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Tax administration (rank)   0.03***  0.03***   0.02***  0.03*** 
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Labour regulation (rank)   -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00 
     (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
License permit (rank)   0.04  0.03  0.04  0.04 
     (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Customs and trade (rank)   0.01*  0.00  0.01  0.01* 
     (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Log GDP per capita (current/PPP)      -0.02  -0.06** 
         (0.02)  (0.02) 
Regulatory quality        -0.07***  -0.04** 
         (0.03)  (0.02) 
Log time to pay tax          0.12*** 
           (0.02) 
Number of tax payments         -0.00 
           (0.00) 
Post-tax filing          -0.00 
           (0.00) 
Former British colony (dummy)      -0.01  0.02 
         (0.08)  (0.09) 
Country fixed effect  --  --  Yes  --  -- 
Constant   0.06  -0.03  -0.03  0.18  -0.06 
   (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.20)  (0.18) 
R2   0.081  0.090  0.141  0.115  0.125 
Number of firms  6840  6208  6208  6208  6208 
Sector fixed effects, city population fixed effects and region fixed effects are included in all the specifications.  
Robust standard errors, clustered at industrial sectors, are in parentheses.  
Sampling weight is used in the regression. ∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
26 
 
 
Table 9 reports the results of the regression using linear probability mode,17 where the 
dependent variable is a dummy for whether tax officials have requested a bribe or not. 
Column I reports results after controlling for firm-specific factors. Column II includes 
frequency of inspection by tax officials and the different regulatory burdens faced by firms. 
Column III reports results after including country fixed effects. Column IV shows results using 
various country-level indictors. In addition, column V includes the various country-level tax 
compliance indicators as a robustness check. The results show that older firms are more 
likely to be requested to pay bribes by tax officials in all the specifications. An increase in a 
firm’s age by 1 percentage point increases the likelihood of a bribe request by about 3 per 
cent. On the other hand, an increase in a manager’s experience by 1 percentage point 
decreases the likelihood of a bribe request by about 4 per cent. The coefficient on female 
ownership becomes positive and significant once country fixed effects are controlled for in 
column III and the results still hold after accounting for various country-level indicators in 
columns IV and V. Female-owned businesses have a higher likelihood of being requested to 
pay bribes by tax officials by about 6 per cent more than male-owned businesses. As 
expected, firms that are frequently inspected by tax officials are more likely to be requested 
to pay bribes as indicated in columns II through V. For every 1 percentage point increase in 
inspection by tax officials, the likelihood of a bribe request increases by about 1 per cent. Of 
the different regulatory burdens, the one associated with tax administration has a higher 
likelihood of being linked to a bribe request by tax officials, with about 3 per cent increase in 
bribe requests for every 1 percentage point increase in the tax administration burden. The 
regulatory burden on customs and trade is also associated with bribe requests by tax officials 
in column II, but the effect is not significant once country fixed effect and various country-
level indicators are controlled for in columns III through V. Firms operating in countries with 
higher income and better regulatory quality are associated with a lower likelihood of bribe 
requests. Results in column V show that for every 1 percentage point increase in the average 
time it takes to file tax, the likelihood that firms are requested to pay bribes by tax officials 
increases by about 12 per cent. The other indicators of tax compliance costs (number of tax 
payments, and post-tax filing index) do not have significant correlation with requests to pay 
bribes to tax officials. The general results in Table 9 indicate that the tax administration 
burden is associated with a higher probability of bribe requests by tax officials and that 
income and quality of institutions also matter for bribe requests.   
 
The study next looks at how bribe requests by tax officials affect firms’ overall compliance 
costs. Table 10 reports results using the ordinary least squares method where the dependent 
variable is a logarithm of the percentage of management time spent in dealing with various 
government regulations. Results in column I of Table 10 show that an increase in frequency 
of inspection by tax officials by one increases compliance costs by 4 per cent, confirming the 
correlation graph depicted in Figure 6. Column II and III show the correlation with bribe 
requests by tax officials. Firms that stated that tax officials requested bribes during their visits 
report lower compliance costs. Those firms that are requested to pay bribes to tax officials 
report a compliance cost that is almost 18 per cent lower than those that were not requested 
to pay bribes to tax officials, as indicated in column II. The result does not change much 
when using different specifications (country fixed effects in column II and controlling for 
various country-level variables in column III). This result can be interpreted in line with those 
obtained in the previous sections. Results in sections 4.2 through 4.5 show that of the 
different regulatory burdens that firms face, tax administration is the most important one in 
contributing to overall compliance costs. Results in Table 9 further show that the regulatory 
burden associated with tax administration is linked with bribe requests from officials, while 
the other regulatory burdens show no significant correlation. This suggest that regulatory 
                                                            
17  Non-linear probability models (logit or probit) yield qualitatively identical results. Results from a linear model are reported 
because they are more straightforward in terms of both estimation procedure and interpretation. The linear model is also 
less sensitive to distributional assumptions concerning the error terms (Angrist and Pischke 2008), which is important 
given the study’s use of several dummy controls. 
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burdens associated with tax administration are relevant for compliance costs and firms may 
look to informal ways to reduce the burden by paying bribes to tax officials. However, one 
should note that such bribes may be initiated to reduce the amount of tax that firms pay and 
not just the compliance costs associated with regulatory burdens. In addition, the time it 
takes to negotiate on the amount of the bribe between firms and tax officials might be part of 
the ‘compliance costs’ and this may differ depending on the experience of firms in handling 
the negotiating. Unfortunately, the data does not distinguish between bribes that are likely to 
be paid in order to reduce tax rates and those that are meant to lower the compliance costs 
associated with the regulatory burden.  
 
Table 10 Compliance costs, tax inspection and bribe payment 
Dependent variable: Log percentage of management time spent in dealing with government regulations 
      I  II  III 
Frequency of tax inspection           0.04***  0.02**   0.03*** 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Bribe to tax officials (dummy)      -0.18**   -0.17**  
        (0.07)  (0.07) 
Country fixed effect     Yes  Yes  -- 
Country-level variables    --  --  Yes 
Constant      1.22***  1.80**  1.40 
(0.26)  (0.82)  (0.84) 
R2      0.132  0.105  0.082 
Number of firms     8242  6162  6162 
Individual level characteristics as in column I of Table 9 are included in all specifications. Sector fixed effects and city population 
fixed effects are controlled for in all specifications. The country-level variables are similar to those included in Table 9. Sampling 
weight is used in the regression. ∗ Significant at 10%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ significant at 1%. 
 
 
4  Conclusion  
 
There is a growing interest among policy makers in cutting the red tape which businesses 
face that is related to government regulations, to help improve their performance and create 
more jobs. However, most businesses still face challenges, especially in the area of taxation, 
which is consistently identified as the key area of concern from an administrative burden 
viewpoint (WDR 2004). This study examines the effect of the tax administration burden on 
firms’ compliance costs in Africa. The study uses a firm-level indicator of compliance costs 
related to various government regulations, measured as an opportunity cost of staff time, 
from 17 SSA countries. This data has been obtained from the World Banks’ Enterprise 
Surveys. The results show that regulatory burdens related to tax administration significantly 
increase compliance costs compared to burdens related to other kinds of government 
regulations. The study further looks at how firms’ relationships with tax officials affect their 
compliance costs. While firms that are frequently inspected by tax officials have higher 
compliance costs, firms that are requested to pay bribes by tax officials, on the other hand, 
have lower compliance costs. These results, that remain robust after accounting for other 
firm-, sector- and country-specific factors, highlight that regulatory burdens related to taxation 
play a bigger role in increasing compliance costs in SSA than other forms of regulatory 
burdens, and that firms may look to informal ways to reduce the burden by paying bribes to 
tax officials. The various firm- and country-level determinants of compliance costs further 
reveal the following results. Firms that export their products have high compliance costs. On 
the other hand, firms with experienced managers have lower compliance costs. Firms 
operating in countries with better institutional qualities, captured by countries’ regulatory 
quality, are also found to have lower compliance costs.   
 
The results of this study add to the growing literature on the impact of the tax administration 
burden in developing countries by providing evidence on its importance to firms’ overall 
compliance costs compared to other forms of government regulations. Policies that aim to 
help the growth of the private sector in Africa by improving the overall business environment 
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should take measures that also help ease regulatory burdens associated with tax 
administration. Furthermore, the finding of the study that reveals that frequent inspection by 
tax officials not only increases overall compliance costs but also raises the likelihood of bribe 
requests by tax officials, suggests that countries should invest in alternative mechanisms to 
increase tax compliance that can help minimise direct contact with tax officials.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 7 Cross-country correlation between compliance costs and regulatory quality 
excluding South Sudan and Sudan 
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Table 11 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Number of 
observations 
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent variable      
% of management time spent on government 
regulations 
8538 9.53 18.38 0 100 
Firm-specific variables      
Age 8538 13 9.67 0 50 
Female (dummy) 8538 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Small (dummy) 8538 0.69 0.46 0 1 
Medium (dummy) 8538 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Public (dummy) 8538 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Export (dummy) 8538 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Management experience (years) 8538 14 9.58 0 60 
Tax administration (rank) 8462 1.59 1.26 0 4 
Labour regulation (rank) 8407 0.99 1.08 0 4 
License permit (rank) 8373 1.19 1.16 0 4 
Customs and trade (rank) 8194 1.38 1.29 0 4 
Tax inspection (dummy) 8156 0.68 0.46 0 1 
Frequency of tax inspection 7914 2.39 4.38 0 60 
Bribe to tax officials (dummy) 5962 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Sector fixed effects      
Garments 8538 0.002 0.04 0 1 
Food processing 8538 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Metals and machinery 8538 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Electronics 8538 0.005 0.07 0 1 
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 8538 0.01 0.12 0 1 
Wood and furniture 8538 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Non-metallic and plastic materials 8538 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Auto and auto components 8538 0.004 0.06 0 1 
Other manufacturing 8538 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Retail and wholesale trade 8538 0.39 0.48 0 1 
Construction, transportation, etc. 8538 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Hotels and restaurants 8538 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Other services 8538 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Country-specific variables      
GDP per capita (current/PPP) 17 3075.78 2250.59 696.97 9985.28 
Non-resource tax to GDP ratio 17 13.41 6.46 1.68 30.67 
Regulatory quality 17 -0.66 0.47 -1.63 0.069 
Corruption 17 -0.78 0.53 -1.61 0.23 
Former British colony (dummy) 17 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Time to pay tax (hours) 17 323 233.02 82 956 
Number of tax payments per year 17 35.78 8.12 23 59 
Post-tax filing 17 53.71 24.68 17.19 94.04 
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